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Courts disagree on the extent of relief required to compensate an injured
plaintiff. One such disagreement involves damages for the lost enjoyment of
life.2 known as hedonic damages. Some courts hold that an injured plaintiff is
not entitled to recover for the lost enjoyment of life; others view hedonic
damages as an integral part of making an injured plaintiff whole and grant
compensation for the reduction in the plaintiffs ability to enjoy life. In those
jurisdictions that recognize hedonic damages, only a minority allow expert

1. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Danages: The Rapidly
Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1042-43 (2004) (explaining the disagreement
between courts as to whether to award a certain type of damages).
2.
See id. at 1038. 1042-43.
3.
See id at 1043.
4.
See id at 1042.
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testimony to establish the value of the plaintiff's lost enjoyment of life. South
Carolina recognizes a right to hedonic damages as a compensable portion of an
injured plaintiffs intangible loss6 but has not addressed the admissibility of an
economist's expert testimony on the value of a plaintiff s hedonic damages.
This Note examines whether expert testimony using the willingness-to-pay
method to develop a monetary value for the lost enjoyment of life would be
admissible in South Carolina. Part 11 provides an overview of hedonic damages
by examining their origin, their treatment compared with other forms of
recovery, and some criticisms of this form of damages. Part III examines the
methods used to value hedonic damages and the jurisdictional disagreement as to
whether to allow expert testimony using the willingness-to-pay method. Part IV
argues that South Carolina courts would find expert testimony on hedonic
damages inadmissible under South Carolina Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.
Part V offers some concluding remarks.
A majority of courts find that expert testimony on hedonic damages is
inadmissible. South Carolina would likely adopt this majority position based on
three principal grounds. First, such expert testimony fails to assist the trier of
fact because the economic models that measure lost enjoyment of life only
capture the value placed on the life of a statistically average person, and use
sources too attenuated to capture a specific individual's value of enjoying life.
Second, South Carolina courts insist that intangible loss, by its very nature, is not
quantifiable in a precise sense.9 Because of this lack of precise measure, most
jurisdictions, including South Carolina., do not require that damages for
intangible losses be discounted to present value. For similar reasons, per diem
arguments are only allowed if clearly labeled as an argument and not as
evidence.11 Finally, unfair prejudice substantially outweighs any probative value
of expert testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its South
Carolina counterpart.1

5. See id. at 1043.
6.
See Boan v. Blackwell, 343 S.C. 498, 502, 541 S.E.2d 242, 245 (2001).
7.
See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note I, at 1043.
8.
See e.g., Ayers v. Robinson. 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (N.D. 111.1995) (describing how
the willingness-to-pay model experts employ "estimates the value of a statistical life," rather than a
specific individual).
9.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1964) ("Pain and
suffering have no market price.").
10. See Rhodan v. United States, 754 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (D.S.C. 1991) (citing Phillips v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-15 (D.S.C. 1983)).
I1. See Edwards. 244 S.C. at 281, 136 S.E.2d at 711.
12. See Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1062.
13. S.C. R. EVID. 403.
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II. ORIGINS OF HEDONIC DAMAGES
Where a plaintiff suffers physical injury, tort damages aim to compensate for
all injuries the defendant's wrongdoing proximately caused.14 Traditionally,
these injuries are divided into tangible and intangible components.
The
tangible component consists of losses such as medical expenses and lost wages
that employment earnings records and hospital bills confirm.16 The intangible
component of damages lacks the clarity that the sources used to confirm the
tangible component provide. 1 Courts group the many components of intangible
losses into two categories: (1) "pain and suffering," representing the
"physiological experience resulting from bodily harm," and (2) "mental or
emotional distress, which is the psychological response to an injury or threatened
Courts disagree as to whether to categorize hedonic damages as a

injury."'

subcomponent of pain and suffering or as its own form of intangible loss, and
whether to include the damages as part of the jury charge or in a special
interrogatory.

19

Though the term "hedonic damages" was not used until the 1980s. 20 courts
have long considered damages for the loss of enjoyment of life to be an element
of damages.
The term "hedonic" derives from the Greek word "hedon(e)"
meaning "pleasure" or "pleasurable."22 Sherrod v. Berry2 is the first case to use
the term "hedonic damages. 24 In Sherrod, a federal district court allowed an
economist to testify regarding the value of a deceased plaintiff's enjoyment of
life using complex economic models for the express purpose of helping the jury
resolve the problem of valuing human life.25 The expert defined the "hedonic
value of life" as "the larger value of life, the life at the pleasure of society ... the
value including economic, including moral, including philosophical, including

14.

See 22 AM. JLR. 2D Danages § 122 (2003) (citing King v. Cooney-Eckstein Co., 63 So.

659, 661 (Fla. 1913)).
15.

F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 613

(4th ed. 2011).
16.

See id.

17. See id
18. See id.
at 613-14.
19. See Schwartz & Silvernan. supra note 1, at 1042-43.
20. See id. at 1041.
21. See, e.g., Bassett v. Milwaukee N. Ry. Co., 170 N.W. 944, 946-47 (Wis. 1919) (quoting
Benson v. Superior Mfg. Co., 132 N.W. 633, 637 (Wis. 1911)) (recognizing that the jury could
consider "diminished capacity for enjoying life" in determining damages to injured plaintiff).
22. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note I, at 1041.
23. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'den banc, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
24. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1041: see also Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 163
(providing the first use of the term in this lawsuit).
25. See Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162. Interestingly, the hedonic damages in this case
represented a form of recovery from a wrongful death claim. See id. at 160. Of the states that
recognize hedonic damages, many jurisdictions do not allow for the recovery of hedonic damages in
a wrongful death suit. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1. at 1042.
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all the value with which you might hold life . . . ."26 Other courts have since
adopted the phrase and found that hedonic damages compensate a plaintiff's lost
ability to "derive pleasure from the normal activities of daily life, or ... to
pursue his talents, recreational interests, hobbies, or avocations." Although the
Seventh Circuit reversed Sherrod on appeal without considering the expert
testimony issue,28 Sherrod laid the foundation for the debate surrounding the
expert testimony of economists on the lost enjoyment of life.29
Jurisdictions that recognize hedonic damages disagree over the classification
of such damages.3 0 Some jurisdictions view hedonic losses merely as one of a
variety of factors for the jury to consider when awarding damages for pain and
suffering)
Other jurisdictions, including South Carolina, instruct the jury that
hedonic damages is its own separate award of intangible loss.
111. VALUING HEDONIC DAMAGES

Placing a value on intangible damages is a difficult and imprecise task.
Courts grapple with two possible methods to assist a jury in placing a value on
an injured plaintiffs lost enjoyment of life.34 The first possibility gives the jury
complete latitude to determine the value of the plaintiffs lost enjoyment of life,
guided by its own experience and testimony from the victim, the victim's family
and friends, and expert psychologists.3 This method of valuing hedonic loss is
allowed as a matter of course in every jurisdiction that allows hedonic
damages. 6 In addition to this type of evidence, the second method allows an
economist to provide context for the calculation of damages by synthesizing
various labor, consumer, and government studies concerning the economic value

26. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 163.
27. Boan v. Blackwell, 343 S.C. 498, 502, 541 S.E.2d 242, 244 (2001).
28. See Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 1988).
29. See Sherrod,629 F. Supp. at 164.
30. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note I, at 1042-43.
31. See e.g., Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990) (upholding jury
instructions indicating that a loss of enjoyment of life is "an element of disability, pain, and
suffering").
32. See, e.g., Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 846 (N.M. 1994); Boan, 343 S.C. at 502-03,
541 S.E.2d at 245 ("[A] separate charge on hedonic damages will minimize the risk that a jury will
under- or over-compensate an injured person for her noneconomic losses.... In situations where
the differences may be difficult to discern, defendants may request the submission of a separate
interrogatory.").
33. See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein. Dollars and Death. 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
537, 544 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of placing a value on a life).
34. Compare Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing the jury to
place a value on the loss of opportunity to enjoy life after hearing testimony), with Lewis v. Alfa
Laval Separation, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 426, 433, 438 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (including an economist's
expert testimony in evidence).
35. See, e.g., Smith, 177 F.3d at 31 (allowing the jury to assess testimony).
36. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Damages Awarded for
Injuries to -Nervesor Nervous System, 51 A.L.R.5TH 467, 519 (1997).
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of human life.
This method is considerably more controversial and has been
admitted on relatively few occasions.'
4. The 4cceptedAIethods
Where a plaintiff is injured, the jury is tasked with valuing all forms of
intangible loss that the plaintiff can prove.
The jury's personal experiences
along with other testimony that establishes the extent of the plaintiffs lost
enjoyment of life, including testimony from the injured plaintiff herself as to the
extent of her own lost enjoyment of life guides their determination.4 0 In Smith v.
Kmart Corp.,4 1 the First Circuit upheld a $500,000 award for intangible losses,
including lost enjoyment of life,42 where a plaintiff was injured as a result of a
falling cooler in a Kmart store.43 The plaintiff testified that the accident
impaired her ability to engage in many of the pleasurable pursuits of life,
including traveling with her husband, performing household chores, and
engaging in social activities such as dancing and taking aerobics.44 In addition to
the personal testimony of a plaintiff, individuals close to a plaintiff with
knowledge of her activities before and after an injury may also testify to provide
context for a plaintiff s lost enjoyment of life. 45 In Smith, the plaintiff s husband
bolstered the jury's damage valuation by testifying that the plaintiffs social
relationships and the couple's marital relationship suffered as a result of the
accident .
Courts also allow some type of expert testimony to aid the jury's
determination of the lost enjoyment of life.4 Medical experts may testify as to
the extent of a plaintiff s physical injuries and the impact of those injuries on a
plaintiff's normal life.48 Additionally, a psychologist may testify to illustrate the

37. See, e.g., Lewis, 714 N.E.2d at 429-30. 436 (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting
an economists calculations where he compared his own figure with those established by OSHA and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
38. See, e.g.. id at 438 (calling testimony based on the willingness-to-pay method "shaky but
admissible" and stating that other cases support excluding such testimony (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
39. See Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1964) (quoting Harper
v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541. 548. 124 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1962)).
40. See, e.g, Smith, 177 F.3d at 23, 31 (illustrating testimony ajury might hear and providing
that it was for thejury to weigh).
41. 177 F.3d 19.
42. Id. at 32.
43. See id. at 22.
44. See id. at 31.
45. See, e.g, id. at 23-24 (presenting testimony from neighbors about plaintiffs changed
behavior after an injury).
46. See id. at 23.
47. See, e.g., Sumner v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 1358. 1364. 1369 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)
(awarding damages for loss ofenjoyment of life after experts testified at trial).
48. See, e.g.. id. at 1364 (expert testified on medical expenses).
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extent of the plaintiff's psychological injuries resulting from an accident. 9 For
example, in Horton v. Channing,$ a Florida state court admitted a psychologist's
testimony about the extent of psychological trauma a family suffered for several
51
years following an accident.
These forms of admissible testimony support a value of the lost enjoyment
of life by providing the jury with context for the quality of the plaintiffs life and
the extent it is impacted by an injury where the witness has firsthand knowledge
of the plaintiff's injury. The testimony of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's family,
and a psychologist stops short of offering an opinion as to the monetary value the
jury should assign to the lost enjoyment of life. Where such determinations are
reserved for the jury, courts are willing to allow plaintiffs to offer considerable
evidence supporting the impact of an injury on the enjoyment of life.
B. Expert Testimony Based on the Willingness-to-PayMethod
Courts are less willing to admit testimony where an expert, without firsthand
knowledge of a plaintiffs life or injury, uses generic statistical data to offer the
jury a concrete, specific value for the lost enjoyment of life.54 In Sherrod, the
first case to address this conflict, the court allowed an economist to present
forensic evidence establishing the value individuals place on the enjoyment of
life. 5 Although the case was subsequently overturned on grounds other than the
56
57
admissibility of the expert, the impact of the decision continues to resonate.
Though the details of the statistical approach vary, all of them can be traced
back to economist Stanley Smith, who adopted a "willingness-to-pay"
approach.i
Smith, a University of Chicago-trained economist,59 is considered a

49. See Horton v. Channing, 698 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting
Angrand v. Key, 657 So. 2d 1146, 1148-49 (Fla. 1995)).
50. 698 So. 2d 865.
51. See id. at 868.
52. See id. (quoting Angrand, 657 So. 2d at 1148-49).
53. See. e.g., Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing multiple
witnesses to testify).
54. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lawton. 244 S.C. 276. 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1964) (stating that
while evidence helps to establish the amount of damages to award, only the jury can "place a
monetary value thereon").
55. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. 111.1985). rev'd en banc, 856 F.2d 802
(7th Cir. 1988). Interestingly, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
would later reconsider the issue and hold that expert economic testimony was not admissible to
establish the value of hedonic damages. See Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
56. See Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 1988).
57. See. e.g, Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 62 (Nev. 2004) (citations omitted)
(explaining the split in the courts as to whether to allow economists to testify and deciding to adopt
the approach that they are allowed to do so); Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1041 (giving
credit to the economist in the case for coining the term "hedonic damages").
58. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1061.
59. Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863. 868 (7th Cir. 1992).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss4/12

6

Lambert: The Price of Life: A Prediction of South Carolina's Approach to E
2013]

TORT LAW

1043

leading authority on using economic theory to value the lost enjoyment of life.60
Simply put, the willingness-to-pay method derives a value of human life by first
determining the statistical yearly net hedonic value of life, representing the value
the average individual places on the enjoyment of life.61 Second, a psychologist
derives the individual plaintiff's "lost pleasure of life," representing the extent
the plaintiff s life is impaired from the injury. The net hedonic value of life is
then multiplied by the plaintiffs lost pleasure of life to determine a yearly value
for the individual plaintiffs hedonic loss.63 Finall, the plaintiffs yearly net
hedonic loss is multiplied by the plaintiffs life expectancy to determine a lump
sum owed to the plaintiff to compensate for the lost enjoyment of life, which is
then discounted to present value64 The method is explained in more detail
below.
The statistical yearly net hedonic value of life is first derived by determining
the value of life as a whole through willingness-to-pay studies. These studies
determine the value of life by measuring how much an individual is "willing to
pay" to reduce her risk of inJury or how much an individual would accept to
increase her risk of injury.
Smith and other expert economists value life
through three categories: consumer-market studies, labor studies, and costbenefit studies from regulatory agencies.
Consumer-market studies value human life by observing how much an
individual is willing to spend on safety devices, such as smoke detectors or
airbags, and dividing that spending by the amount those devices reduce an
individual's probability of dying. 68 For example, assume that a consumer's
decision to buy airbags in a car reduces her probability of death from two in
10,000 to one in 10,000-a difference of one in 10,000. If a particular consumer
spent $500 to have airbags installed in her car. Smith would argue that she places
a value on her life of $5,000,000.69
Labor-market-willingness-to-pay studies provide the value a worker places
on her life as evidenced by the additional compensation she will demand to take

60. See, e.g., Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1061 (referring to Smith as an expert
who literally wrote the book on hedonic damages").
61. See Edward P. Berla et al., Hedonic Danages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual

Approach, J.FORENSIc ECON., Dec. 1989, at 4-5.
62. See id. at 1, 5.
63. See id. at 5.
64. See id Many jurisdictions use treasury tables as a guide for life expectancy. See id.
South Carolina uses a different table, enacted by statute, to determine life expectancy in litigation.
S.C. CODE ANN,. § 19-1-150 (1976).
65. See id at 4.
66. See Dennis C. Taylor, Note, Your foney or Your Life?: Thinking About the Use of
Willingness-to-Pay Studies to Calculate Hedonic Damages, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1519. 1521
(1994).
67. See id at 1524.
68. See Andrew Jay McClurg, It's
a Wlonderfid Life: The Case fJoHedonic Danages in
Wrongfid Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 102-03 (1990).
69. $500+(710,000)= $5,000,000.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 12
1044

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64: 1037

on riskier work, which is an extension of Adam Smith's discussion in The
Wealth of Mations." This information enables economists to calculate the value
of life by taking the additional amount an individual demands to take on riskier
employment and dividing the additional compensation by the increased
probability of dying.
For example, assume that a window washer demands
$500 in additional compensation to move from washing windows on the first
floor to washing windows on the twentieth floor of a skyscraper. Assuming that
the additional nineteen-story suspension increases the window washer's
probability of death from one in 10,000 to two in 10,000, economists assert that
the window washer values her life at $5 million.72
Cost-benefit studies conducted by government agencies and used to value
regulations provide a third type of data for valuing human life." The range of
numbers that government agencies use is hardly consistent, ranging from a value
of life by the Consumer Product Safety Commission at a mere $70,000 up to
$132 million by the Food and Drug Administration.74
The willingness-to-pay method aggregates the observations of all three kinds
of studies to arrive at the value of life for a "statistically average person."7 5 This
amount is used to calculate the net hedonic value of life by taking the value of a
statistically average life and subtracting out all "non-hedonic" value of life,
including the value of lost earnings, fringe benefits, and household services. 76
The economist breaks this net hedonic value of life into a yearly amount by
dividing the net hedonic value by the remaining life expectancy of an average
person. Consider the following example:

70. See McClurg, supra note 68, at 102 (citing Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value
of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market. in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION 265, 266 (Nestor E. Terleckyj ed., 1976)); see also 1 ADAM SMITH. THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 88-107 (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1933) (1976) (for this discussion).
71. See id
72. This computation functions in the same manner as the air bag example above. $500
(110,000) = $5 000 000.
73. See McClurg, supra note 68, at 106 & n.214 (citing Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D.
Hopkins, Federal Agency Valuations of Human Life: A Report to the Administrative Conference of
the United States 2 (Dec. 7, 1988) (unpublished report) (on file with the University of Dayton
Roesch Library)).
74. See id (citing Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 73, at 2).
75. See Berla et al.. supra note 61, at 5.
76. See id.
77. See id. The Seventh Circuit stated, "The statistically average person is 31 years old with
a 45 year additional life expectancy." Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 1992). In
the interest of simple math, the following in-text example adopts a fifty-year remaining life
expectancy.
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Value of life of a statistically average person
(determined through consumer-market studies, labor studies,
and government cost benefit studies)
Value of average lost earnings, fringe benefits, and household
services

Equals $3,000.000
Divided by 50
Equals $60,000

Net hedonic value of life
Remaining life expectancy of average person
Yearly net hedonic value of life

Once the economist determines a yearly net hedonic value of life, the
calculation then yields to the expertise of a psychologist. In the second phase
of the willingness-to-pay model, the yearly net hedonic value of life is multiplied
by the plaintiffs lost pleasure of life.79 The psychologist evaluates the mental
health impacts of the plaintiffs injury on the Lost Pleasure of Life Scale (LPL
Scale), ranging from zero to 100 as the plaintiff s injury becomes more severe.so
The LPL Scale measures the percentage of a plaintiffs lost pleasure of life in
multiple areas including everything from the ability to feed oneself, to
interacting with loved ones, to the lost ability to derive pleasure from a choice of
occupation.81 These measures vary depending on the injury and may not remain
constant over the plaintiffs life; therefore, psychologists are instructed to take
this variance into account.8 For instance, a psychologist may testify that the
plaintiffs lost pleasure of life will be extreme for three years following the
accident and then will decline to a minimal level for the rest of the plaintiffs
life.8 In that case, the LPL Scale measure would be highest in the first three
years and then would fall to some lower measure as defined by the
psychologist. 84
Assuming for simplicity, however, that a psychologist
determined that the plaintiff lost thirty percent of her enjoyment of life as a result
of the injury the defendant caused, this component of the willingness-to-pay
model would be calculated as follows:
$60,000
Times 30%
Equals $18,000

Yearly net hedonic value of life of statistically
average person
Plaintiff's lost pleasure of life
Plaintiff's yearly net hedonic value of life

The remaining life expectancy of the plaintiff-the third component of the
willingness-to-pay model-is multiplied by the plaintiffs yearly net hedonic

78. See Berla et al, supra note 61 at 5.
79. See id
80. See id at 2-4 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 11, 18-19 (3rd ed. 1987)).
8 1. See id at 2.
82. See id at 3-4.
83. See id. at 4.
84. See id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 12
1046

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64: 1037

value of life to arrive at the plaintiffs individual hedonic value of life.8
Assuming that the hypothetical plaintiff above has a remaining life expectancy
of twenty years, the economist would discount the $18,000 yearly net hedonic
value of life (over the remaining twenty-year life expectancy) to its present value
to arrive at a final number to present to the jury as representing the plaintiffs
lost pleasure of life.86
C. Other Jurisdictions' Treatment of the TWillingness-to-Pay Method
1. Majority Rule: Testimony Based on the Tillingness-to-PavMethod
Inadmissible
A majority of courts hold that expert testimony using the willingness-to-pay
method is inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403 based on
several principal objections.
First, the willingness-to-pay method values the
"hypothetical person," rather than the individual plaintiff in the suit, making
such testimony irrelevant and thus inadmissible under Rule 702.88 Whether the
plaintiff is a thirty-two-year-old billionaire triathlete or a ninety-five-year-old
nursing-home patient that can barely get out of bed, the value of the lost
enjoyment of life is presumed to be the same.89
Second, the willingness-to-pay method rests on faulty assumptions. 90
Consumer willingness-to-pay studies fail to consider that some individuals are
more willing or able to spend money on safety than others. 91 The method also
ignores human susceptibility to marketing and pressures to be a "cautious"
person.92 Similarly, labor studies rest on the questionable assumption that an
individual's choice of employment is entirely motivated by monetary incentive
and that humans accurately perceive risk.
Third, the willingness-to-pay method has not gained fundamental acceptance
in the economics community. 4 In Ayers v. Robinson,95 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois took particular exception to the
assertion that the willingness-to-pay method as applied to hedonic loss was

85.
86.
87.

See id at 5.
See id.
See id. Most states have adopted some version of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 6

JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE TI (Joseph M.

McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997) (listing states that have adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence). Each rule is explored in detail below.
88. See Scharrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.. 949 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo. App. 1997).
89. See id
90. See Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 870-71 (7th Cir. 1992).
91. See id.
92. See id
93. See id
94. See id.
95. 887 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. 111.1995).
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entrenched in the economics community, finding that the expert's tracing his
valuation of human life back to Adam Smith's The Tealth of Nations, "coats
[the] novel use of a quite recent economic theory with a vintage veneer that it
does not deserve." 96 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found it "irrefutable" that
there was "no expert consensus supporting [the expert's] methodology"
Fourth, the value of a human life resulting from these studies is so wideld
varied that the valuations cannot be considered reliable under Rule 702.
Finally, courts fear that expert testimony on hedonic damages usurps the power
of a jury; thus, the unfair prejudice to the defendant outweighs the probative
value of testimony using the willingness-to-pay method, in violation of Rule
403.99 Because loss of enjoyment of life is inherently subjective, the jury is in
the best position to make an individualized determination as to the value of a
particular plaintiffs enjoyment of life. 100 For example, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii affirmed a trial court's decision not to allow expert testimony on hedonic
damages finding that an economist could not assist the jury because "an
economist is no more expert at valuing the pleasure of life than the average
juror."10 1
2.

Minority Rule: Testimony Based on the WJillingness-to-PayMethod
4dmissible

Jurisdictions that allow expert testimony using the willingness-to-pay
method to value hedonic damages pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 702
and 403102 generally find the testimony admissible for three reasons. First, the
willingness-to-pay method is the subject of substantial peer review in the
economics community.103 Second, the willingness-to-pay method is admissible
because economists have expertise to assist the jury in determining the
"monetary value of intangibles." 104
Third, parties defending against the
willingness-to-pay method are free to offer their own experts to make the jury

96. Id. at 1063.
97. See Mlercado, 974 F.2d at 871. Interestingly, Stanley Smith was the expert offered in this
case. See id. at 868; see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing Stanley Smith).
98. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note I, at 1067 (quoting Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1061
n.4).
99. See id.
100. See Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 366 (H-aw. 1994) (quoting Foster v. Trafalgar
House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. Ct. App. 1992)).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Lewis v. Alta Lav al Separation, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 426, 433, 438 (Ohio Ct. App.
1998) (finding the testimony based on the willingness-to-pay method "shaky but admissible" under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702). See generally FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing a court to "exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence"); FED. R. EVID. 702 (requirements regarding expert testimony).
103. See Lewis. 714 N.E.2d at 436.
104. See Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 63 (Nev. 2004).
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aware of the flaws of the willingness-to-pay method.10
however, are in the decided minority. 106
IV.

[VOL. 64: 1037
These decisions,

EXPERT TESTIMONY USING THE WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY METHOD IN SOUTH
CAROLINA

The courts of South Carolina have not yet had the occasion to decide
whether expert economic testimony on hedonic damages is admissible. While
many states determine the admissibility of expert testimony inder the federal
standard outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., o0the South
Carolina Supreme Court declined to adopt Daubert in State v. Councillos and,
instead, opted to evaluate expert testimony tinder the interpretation of the South
Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE).1 09 Under this approach, a court first
evaluates the expert's testimony under SCRE 702 and may only admit the
expert's testimony if: (1) the evidence "will assist the trier of fact," (2) the expert
is qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," and (3) the
science underlying the expert's testimony is reliable. 0 If testimony is
admissible under SCRE 702. a court then looks to SCRE 403 to determine if the
probative value of the expert's evidence is substantially outweighed by any
potential prejudice.

4. 4dmissibility Under South Carolina Rule ofEvidence 702
1. Assists the Trier ofFact
Under SCRE 702, expert testimony assists the trier of fact when the offering
party can show that the "subject matter [of the expert's testimony] is beyond the
ordinary knowledge of the jury, thus requiring an expert to explain the matter to
the jury." 1 The jury's ultimate role in any case is to be the finder of fact;1 it

105. See id
106. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1043.
107. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
108. 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999).
109. See id. at 20. 515 S.E.2d at 518: see also HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 15, at 197 n.111
(citing Council, 335 S.C. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 518; Kari Thorsvold, Note, Guarding the Gate to
Expert Testimony, Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael and State v. Council, 51 S.C. L. REV. 965, 97879 (2000)) (explaining that the two tests are "functionally very similar").
110. See Council, 335 S.C. at 20 & n.15, 515 S.E.2d at 518 & n.15 (quoting S.C. R. EVID.
702).
111. See id (citing S.C. R. EVID. 403, 702).
112. Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 389 S.C. 434, 446, 699 S.E.2d 169, 175 (2010).
113. See Day v. Kilgore, 314 S.C. 365, 368, 444 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1994) (citing Morrison v.
State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
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must assess the credibility of witnesses'14 and apply the law as provided by the
trial judge to determine the extent of any relief due to an injured plaintiff.
Expert testimony clearly assists the jury where it explains a complex issue
not understood by the average juror and is based on concrete and reliable
information. 6 For example, litigants routinely call economists as experts to
assist the trier of fact in a wrongful death case to provide the jury with a present
value of the decedent's lost income.117 Such calculations require considerable
economic expertise far beyond the average juror's abilities. "1 Thus, where an
economist offers such expert testimony on lost income, it assists the trier of fact
by minimizing unnecessary speculation that the jury is not qualified to make. 119
However, where the expert testifies as to the amount of intangible loss required
to compensate an injured plaintiff, reliable data are simply not present because
such damages are not readily observable, as compared to earning capacity.120
Therefore, South Carolina courts limit an attorney's ability to present a per diem
value for intangible loss
and do not discount intangible loss to present
value,122 in both instances finding intanible loss too speculative to arrive at any
value apart from the jury's discretion.
Similarly, South Carolina courts would
likely not allow expert testimony based on the willingness-to-pay method under
SCRE 702.
Courts allow experts to testify regarding intangible loss in certain limited
circumstances.12 4 Medical experts, for example, may testify as to the extent of
the physical injury sustained by an injured plaintiff in order to aid the jury in
valuing pain and suffering. 125 Similarly, mental health experts may assist the
jury in understanding the extent of psychological damage suffered by an injured
plaintiff to value pain and suffering and lost enjoyment of life.126 Expert
testimony in these instances is, however, limited to understanding the extent of

114. See State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 29, 538 S.E.2d 248, 252 53 (2000).
115. See Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 548, 124 S.E.2d 54. 57 (1962).
116. See Wfatson, 389 S.C. at 445-46, 669 S.E.2d at 175.
117. See, e.g., Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 379-80, 342 S.E.2d 628, 630 (Ct. App. 1986)
("An economist, qualified as an expert witness in calculating financial losses in wrongful death
cases, testified for [the plaintiff].").
118. See 22 Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 769 (citing Hughes v. Pender, 391 A.2d 259, 262
(D.C. 1978)).
119. See id. (citing Hughes, 391 A.2d at 263).
120. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 15, at 613.

12 1. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1964) (stating that
counsel should refrain from giving a per diem value because "only the jury [can] place a monetary
value thereon").
122. See Rhodan v. United States, 754 F. Supp. 76, 78 79 (D.S.C. 1991) (citing Phillips v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-1315 (D.S.C. 1983)).
123. See id. at 78 & n.10; Edwards, 244 S.C. at 281, 136 S.E.2d at 711.
124. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Car/Puter Int'l Corp., 521 F. Supp. 276, 283-84 (D.S.C. 1981)
(allowing doctors to testify about plaintiff's "emotional scars" and psychological impairment from a
boating accident).
125. See Scott v. Porter. 340 S.C. 158, 171, 530 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ct. App. 2000).
126. See Sweeney, 521 F. Supp. at 283-84, 289.
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the intangible harm caused by the injury and does not extend to the economic
value of the harm.127
South Carolina cases emphasize that an award for hedonic damages requires
jurors to award "money for injuries which are not readily reducible to specific
amounts." 28 Although South Carolina courts have offered no further insight
into hedonic damages, courts yield to the jury in valuing similar intangible
loss.129 In Smalls v. South CarolinaDepartment ofEducation.1 30 a pick-up truck
struck and killed an eight-year-old girl as she crossed the street to board the
school bus.
The jury awarded damages of $310,000, an amount which
exceeded the child's medical bills by more than $250.000 and included
compensation for pain and suffering.
In upholding the jury's value of
damages, the court noted that "[the jury's determination of damages ... is
entitled to substantial deference." 13 Therefore, a jury's determination as to
hedonic damages would likely be afforded the same deference.
Additionally, South Carolina's restriction on the use of the per diem method
of valuing pain and suffering indicates that courts would find that an economist's
testimony on hedonic damages would not assist the trier of fact.1' 4 The per diem
method of valuing pain and suffering is calculated by defining the amount of a
plaintiff s pain and suffering for a specified time period and multiplying it by the
amount of time the plaintiff will suffer. 35 South Carolina allows attorneys to
argue that the jury should adopt such a method for valuing a plaintiff's pain and
suffering provided that the attorney makes clear that the determination of the
value rests entirely with the jury.1 ' 6 In Edwards v. Lawton, 13 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's attorney could argue the per diem method
to value pain and suffering because the attorney emphasized that "only the jury
could place a monetary value" on pain and suffering.1' 8 The court concluded,
"[D]amages for pain and suffering are unliquidated and indeterminate in

127. See id. at 284.
128. Boan v. Blackwell, 343 S.C. 498, 502, 541 S.E.2d 242, 245 (2001) ("[A] separate charge
on hedonic damages will minimize the risk that a jury will under- or over-compensate an injured
person for her noneconomic losses.... In situations where the differences may be difficult to
discern, defendants may request the submission of a separate interrogatory.").
129. See, e.g., Smalls v. S.C. Dep't of Educ., 339 S.C. 208. 215, 528 S.E.2d 682. 686 (Ct.
App. 2000) (stating that a "jury's determination of damages" in a survival action are "entitled to
substantial deference").
130. 339 S.C. 208. 528 S.E.2d 682.
131. See id. at 214. 528 S.E.2d at 685.
132. See id. at 215. 528 S.E.2d at 685.
133. Id. at 215, 528 S.E.2d at 686.
134. See Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1964).
135. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14, § 222 (citing Giant Food Inc. v. Satterfield. 603 A.2d
877, 878-79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992): Graeff v. Baptist Temple, 576 S.W.2d 291. 302 (Mo.
1978); Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1050 (Wyo. 1978)).
136. See Edwards, 244 S.C. at 281, 136 S.E.2d at 711.
137. 244 S.C. 276, 136 S.E.2d 708.
138. See id. at 281. 136 S.E.2d at 711.
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character and the assessment of unliquidated damages must rest in the sound
discretion of the jury, controlled by the discretionary power of the trial
[j]udge." 139 Since the courts of South Carolina do not allow a plaintiff s attorney
to suggest a value for pain and suffering, it is unlikely that a court would be
willing to admit an economist's testimony to value hedonic damages.140
Furthermore, South Carolina courts do not permit the discounting of
intangible damages to present value.141 Expert testimony in reliance on the
willingness-to-pay method necessarily requires discounting to present value in
contravention of this principle.142 Once the expert has arrived at the plaintiff s
yearly hedonic damages, the expert then discounts the plaintiffs hedonic loss to
present value.143 Therefore, courts would find that such testimony does not
assist the trier of fact.
Expert testimony that places a mathematically ascertainable value on
hedonic damages stands in stark contrast to South Carolina courts' repeated
insistence that intangible damages, both hedonic damages144 and damages for
pain and suffering 145 have no value apart from the jury's subjective
determination. Therefore, South Carolina courts are unlikely to find that an
economist's expert testimony assists the trier of fact in its determination of
hedonic damages.
2.

Expert Qualification

The party offering expert testimony meets the expert qualification
requirement tinder SCRE 702146 if the expert has knowledge or skill in a
profession or science which makes her more "qualified than the jury to form an
opinion on the particular subject of [the expert's] testimony." 47 Any defects in
an expert's education and experience "go to the wveipht [of the expert's
testimony] rather than the admissibility" of such testimony. 48

139. Id. at 281, 136 S.E.2d at 710 (citing Wright v. Gilbert, 227 S.C. 334, 338, 88 S.E.2d 72,
75 (1955)).
140. The Illinois Appellate Court embraced a similar argument to find an economist's expert
testimony on hedonic damages inadmissible. See Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1244-47 (111.
App. Ct. 1991) (citations omitted).
141. See Rhodan v. United States. 754 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (D.S.C. 1991) (citing Phillips v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-15 (D.S.C. 1983)).
142. See Berla et al, supra note 61, at 5.
143. See id.
144. See Boan v. Blackwell. 343 S.C. 498, 502, 541 S.E.2d 242, 245 (2001).
145. See Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1964) (quoting Harper
v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 548, 124 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1962)).
146. See S.C. R. EVID. 702.
147. Risher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 393 S.C. 198, 205, 712 S.E.2d 428, 432
(2011) (quoting Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp., 326 S.C. 248, 252 53, 487 S.E.2d 596, 598
(1997)) (citing S.C. R. EVID. 702).
148. Gooding, 326 S.C. at 253. 487 S.E.2d at 598 (citing Lee v. Suess, 318 S.C. 283, 286, 457
S.E.2d 344, 346 (1995)).
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A trained economist likely possesses the necessary qualifications to make
the complex calculations and adjustments the willingness-to-pay model requires
to estimate hedonic damages. 149 However, assuming that the court finds that the
testimony is not helpful to the jury, then the expert's qualification, no matter
how impressive, is irrelevant.1 0 As noted above, South Carolina courts defer to
the jury's discretion to value a plaintiffs noneconomic damages.15 1 Thus, a
South Carolina court may find that the economist lacks any specialized
knowledge to be better informed than the jury regarding the appropriate value of
a plaintiff s hedonic loSS.152
However, this requirement under SCRE 702 poses the smallest threat to the
admissibility of economic testimony on hedonic damages because, while many
courts hold that expert testimony on hedonic damages is inadmissible, the
objections to the testimony typically go to the utilized methodology rather than
the expert's qualifications.
Therefore, while a court may take exception to an
economist's qualifications to value hedonic loss above the jury, the testimony
will likely be inadmissible on other grounds.
3.

Reliability

The final hurdle for admissibility of expert testimony under SCRE 702 is
that the science underlying the expert's testimony must be reliable under the

149. For example, Stanley Smith, the economist credited with developing the method to place
a value on hedonic damages, is regularly called to testify as an expert. See, e.g.. Sherrod v. Berry,
629 F. Supp. 159, 162 (N.D. 111.1985), rev'd en banc, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988) (Smith testified
as ain expert.); Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 574 (Ct. App. 1998) (same); K.M
Leasing, Inc. v. Butler, 749 So. 2d 310, 319 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (same); Anderson v. Neb. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 741 (Neb. 1995) (same). Smith has made substantial contributions
to the economic study of hedonic loss. See generallvBerla et al., supra note 61 (article describing
how to calculate hedonic damages co-authored by Smith).
150. See supra Part IV.A.l. In the landmark Daubert case, in footnote two, the court outlined
the impressive credentials of the experts at issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 583 n. 2 (1993). On remand to the Ninth Circuit, the court said of the expert qualification
requirement that "something doesn't become 'scientific knowledge' just because it is uttered by a
scientist; nor can an expert's self-serving assertion that his conclusions were 'derived by scientific
method' be deemed conclusive. else the Supreme Court's opinion could have ended with footnote
two.... [T]herefore, though we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of
the witnesses wvhose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine wvhether those
experts' proposed testimony amounts to 'scientific knowledge,' constitutes 'good science,' and was
'derived by the scientific method." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.. 43 F.3d 1311. 1315-16
(9th Cir. 1995).
151. See Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 547-48, 124 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1962) (citing Wright v.
Gilbert, 227 S.C. 334, 338, 38 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1955)).
152. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 366 (Haw. 1994) (finding that ain expert
economist is "no more expert at valuing the pleasure of life than the average juror").
153. See, e.g., Ayers v. Robinson. 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (criticizing the
expert's methodology).
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standard the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted in State v. Council.154 The
court evaluates the reliability of expert testimony using the following factors:
(1) the publications and peer review of the technique; (2) prior
application of the method to the type of evidence involved in the case;
(3) the quality control procedures used to ensure reliability; and (4) the
consistency of the method with recognized scientific laws and
procedures.155
An examination of each factor of the reliability inquiry reveals that a South
Carolina court would likely find expert economic testimony on hedonic damages
inadmissible on the grounds of unreliability.
a. Publicationsand Peer Review of WVillingness-to-Pay Method
Using economic models to value human life has been a matter of
considerable controversy in the economics community for a number of years,
starting with Adam Smith's The WJealth ofjNations, first published in 1776.
n56
this foundational economic work, Smith suggested that coal miners would
demand higher wages for taking on increased risks associated with
employment. 15
T.C. Shelling transformed Smith's work into a method of
valuing life in an article published in 1960, suggesting that Smith's wage-risk
model could be used to provide a cost-benefit analysis for government
regulations.1 5 8 Since Schelling's work, considerable economic literature has
explored the use of occupational and safety decisions to value human life.15
Although the measurement of the value of human life through willingnessto-pay studies is the subject of considerable discussion in the economics
community, economists do not agree on the accuracy of these studies to value
human life. 60 For example, economist Glenn Blomquist called into question the
use of valuing human life through labor studies on foregone earnings, arguing:

154. 335 S.C. 1. 20. 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999).
155. Id. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517 (citing State v. Ford, 301 S.C. 485, 488-89, 392 S.E.2d 781,
783 (1990)).
156. See 1 SMITH, supra note 70, at 88-107.
157. See Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1063 (citing 1 SMITH, supra note 70, at 93). The court
mentions, however, that Smith was quick to point out that humans were poor at appreciating the true
risk of an activity. See id. at 1062 (citing 1 SMITH, supra note 70, at 96-99).
158. See id. at 1063 (citing T.C. Shelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in
PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968)).

159. See, e.g., Bryan C. Conley, he Value of Human Life in the Demnandfor Saftty, 66 Am.
ECON REV. 45. 45-46 (1976) (undermining Schelling's study by suggesting that above a relatively
low income level, persons valued their life at amounts greater than discounted earnings and
discounted consumption); see also Glenn Blomquist, Value of Life Saving: Implications of
Consumption Activitv, 87 J. POL. ECON. 540, 542-46 (1979) (developing an empirical model for
valuing human life on the basis of seat belt use).
160. See, e.g., Blomquist, supra note 159, at 540 (calling the method "unsatisfactory").
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Despite its numerical manageability, [valuing life on the basis of]
foregone earnings is unsatisfactory because there is little theoretical
basis for its use. Foregone earnings neglect the value of nonmarket
activity as well as the surplus value of living and unreasonably imply
that the value of life saving for self-sufficient persons, housewives, and
retirees is zero.161
Even economic works that analyze the willingness-to-pay approach as
potentially valuable to government regulators recognize that the value to society
of a statistically average life is dramatically lower than the value of the life of an
identifiable person, further undermining the reliability of such measures.162 In
addition, economics literature recognizes that humans are exceedingly poor at
appreciating risk, which is an important assumption in willingness-to-pay
models.163
Courts and economists alike recognize the weaknesses in the willingness-topay method, thus undermining the cornerstone of economic expert testimony on
an injured plaintiffs hedonic damages.164 Therefore, an inquiry into the peer
review and publications of the method used by experts to value hedonic damages
weighs against its reliability.
b.

Prior 4pplication of the Willingness-to-Pay Method

Jurisdictions disagree whether expert testimony using the willingness-topay method is admissible to establish a plaintiffs lost enjoyment of life.165 A
majority of courts find expert testimony using the willingness-to-pay method
inadmissible.166 Those states that find such testimony inadmissible have two
principal objections to the willingness-to-pay method. First, the willingness-topay method only values the life of the statistically average person and thus fails
to take into account things that make the plaintiffs loss of enjoyment unique. 17
The goal of awarding damages to compensate an injured plaintiff is not to award
damages for the loss to a hypothetical person.1 68 In fact, the South Carolina
Supreme Court recently noted that the "primary purpose of tort law is that of
compensating plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered wrongfully at the

161. Id.
162. See e.g., John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Willingness to Pay and the Distribution
of Risk and Wealth, 104 J. POL. ECoN. 747, 747-48, 759-60 (1996) (quoting Schelling, supra note
158, at 129).
163. See id. at 748.
164. See supra notes 87-101, 160-63 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part III.C.
166. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1064 (quoting Kurncz v. Honda N. Am., Inc.,
166 F.R.D. 386, 388 (W.D. Mich. 1996)).
167. See Scharrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo. App. 1997).
168. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1066.
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hands of others."169 The Willingness-to-pay method falls short of this stated
goal, however, because the value of life that an economist uses to determine
hedonic damages is the same regardless of the personal characteristics of the
plaintiff.170
The Colorado Court of Appeals found it inconceivable that an economist
could opine on the value of a plaintiffs lost enjoyment of life without ever
speaking to the injured plaintiff or determining what circumstances made their
lives enjoyable.
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals, in finding expert
testimony inadmissible, noted that the value of life relied on as the baseline for
valuing hedonic damages has "nothing to do with this particular plaintiffs
injuries, condition, hobbies, skills, or other factors relevant to her loss of
enjoyment of life."
Second, even accepting that willingness-to-pay studies accurately capture a
value on the whole human life, the majority of courts find that it cannot be
extrapolated to accurately reflect the value of the enjoyment of life.1As
explored earlier, willingness-to-pay studies value the amount that an individual
would pay to avoid death.174 Even assuming that the value of life may be
reasonable, courts still reject the method on the grounds that it is unreliable
because "it has nothing to do with defining the particular value of the loss of
enjoyment oflif." 175
A small minority of courts find an economist's expert testimony on the value
of hedonic damages admissible.176 In several such situations. the cases lack
precedential value.17 7 Of those remaining, the courts of Ohio and Nevada offer

169. See Willis v. Wu. 362 S.C. 146, 159, 607 S.E.2d 63, 69 (2004) (quoting Blake v. Cruz,
698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984)).
170. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note I at 1066-67.
171. See Scharrel, 949 P.2d at 92.
172. Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
173. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 366 (Haw. 1994) (stressing that the expert
may not be able to help a jury value enjoyment of life); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 204 (W.
Va. 1993) (expressing concern over the xvillingness-to-pay studies not actually calculating the loss
of enjoyment of life).
174. See supra Part III.B.
175. Wilt. 443 S.E.2d at 205.
176. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. 111.1985) (United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed expert testimony), rev d en banc, 856 F.2d 802
(7th Cir. 1988); K.M. Leasing, Inc. v. Butler, 749 So. 2d 310, 324 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(Mississippi Court of Appeals allowed expert testimony); Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 981 P.2d 275,
278-79 (Mont. 1999) (Montana Supreme Court allowed expert testimony); Banks v. Sunrise Hosp.,
102 P.3d 52, 63 (Nev. 2004) (Nevada Supreme Court allowed expert testimony); Sena v. N.M. State
Police, 892 P.2d 604, 610-11 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (New Mexico Court of Appeals allowed expert
testimony); Lewis v. Alfa Laval Separation, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 426, 438 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (Ohio
Court of Appeals allowed expert testimony).
177. See, e.g., Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 807 (reversing the lower court's decision, which admitted
expert testimony); K.M. Leasing, Inc., 749 So. 2d at 320, superseded by statute, 2003 Miss. Laws
1289 (codified as amended at MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-69 (Supp. 2012)) (later law supersedes the
case); Hunt, 981 P.2d at 279 (testimony admitted because of defendant's failure to object).
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the most thorough arguments for admitting expert testimony to value hedonic
damages.' 8
In Banks v. Sunrise Hospital 179 the Nevada Supreme Court admitted expert
testimony to value hedonic damages on the grounds that the economist had
specialized knowledge to determine "the monetary value of intangibles." 80
Furthermore, the court emphasized the defendant's freedom to offer its own
expert testimony to refute the methodology or the expert's value on hedonic
damages.' 8' The court found that the expert's specialized knowledge combined
with the defendant's ability to highlight the weaknesses of the expert's testimony
made any probative value of the expert's testimony sufficient to outweigh any
potential prejudice and admitted the testimony. 18
Similarly, in Lewis v. Alfa Laval Separation, Inc.,
the Ohio Court of
Appeals found expert testimony on hedonic damages was "shaky but
admissible."i84 In that case, the court found that the numerous publications in
the economics community on the value of life supported the scientific validity of
the method.185
After highlighting the arguments against allowing such
testimony, the court found that "[a]lthough [it] might have chosen to exclude
[the expert's testimony]," the court could not say that the decision to admit the
testimony was an abuse of discretion.186
Prior application of the willingness-to-pay method to value hedonic damages
reveals that most courts regard such testimony to be inadmissible. 8 While
some courts allow testimony using the willingness-to-pay method, these
decisions are thinly reasoned in comparison to those not admitting testimony.
In addition, a decided majority of courts do not allow testimony, 189 with no
federal court above the district level admitting testimony. Therefore, prior
application of the willingness-to-pay method to hedonic damages weighs against
admitting expert testimony.

178. See Banks, 102 P.3d at 61-64 (citations omitted); Lewis, 714 N.E.2d at 433-38 (citations
omitted).
179. 102 P.3d 52.
180. See id. at 63.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. 714 N.E.2d 426.
184. Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. See id. at 436.
186. See id.
187. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1064 65 (quoting Kurncz v. Honda N. Am.,
Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386, 388 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Foster v. Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284,
286 (La. Ct. App. 1992)).
188. Compare Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1059-64 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citations
omitted) (detailing thoroughly the reasons for the inadmissibility of the testimony), with Banks v.
Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 61-64 (Nev. 2004) (citations omitted) (discussing briefly the
testimony's admissibility).
189. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1043.
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Quality Control

South Carolina courts look to the validity and accuracy of the evidence to
determine whether the evidence meets the quality control requirements for
reliability under SCRE 702.190 The wide range of estimates valuing human life
suggests that any quality control economic experts employ is insufficient to
render such evidence reliable under SCRE 702.
Estimates of the value of life
range immensely.192 In Ayers v. Robinson,193 the court noted that one group of
economists valued life based on the willingness-to-pay method between
$500,000 and $9 million. 194 Government estimates present an even more stark
contrast. 195 At one extreme, the value of life the Consumer Products Safety
Commission estimated is $70,000, contrasted with the upper extreme of $132
million by the Food and Drug Administration.196 Courts and commentators
suggest that the government's numbers are more likely the result of the political
pressures of election cycles and legislative concerns than a carefully scrutinized
and reliable estimate of the value of human life.
Like the outside political concerns affecting government estimates of the
value of life, labor, and consumer willingness-to-pay studies reflect at least a
skewed value of life.198 Regarding labor studies, courts suggest that an
individual's employment decision is motivated by far more than money. 199 For
example, a police officer clearly considers more than money when deciding to
enter into that line of work, because otherwise very few people would be willing
to take on the dangerous job of patrolling crime-ridden areas.200 Labor-marketwillingness-to-pay studies also make the arguably false assumption that
individuals have complete freedom of choice when deciding to pursue an
occupation.20 Many individuals are likely motivated at least as much by a sense

190. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 574, 541 S.E.2d 813, 819 (2001) (finding evidence
was not reliable where there was not sufficient quality control to ensure the "validity, accuracy, and
repeatability" of the process (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 21,
515 S.E.2d 508. 518 (1999) (finding that evidence met the quality control requirement when a lab
validated the process and determined [the] rate of error").
191. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note I, at 1067 (quoting Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1061
n.4).
192. See id. (quoting Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1061 n.4).
193. 887 F. Supp. 1049.
194. See id at 1063.
195. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1, at 1067 (quoting Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1061
n.4).
196. See id (quoting Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1061 n.4).
197. See, e.g., Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 1992) (court suggesting
political concerns affect value of life estimates): Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 1. at 1067
(commentators suggesting the same).
198. See Mercado, 974 F.2d at 871.
199. See id
200. See id.
201. See Kurncz v. Honda N. Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386, 389 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
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of civic duty or a need to provide for their families as they are by an appreciation
of risk and reward.20 2
In addition, using a consumer's decision to buy a safety device as a
benchmark to value human life has considerable shortcomings in terms of
reliability. 20 First, an individual may simply lack the financial resources to
spend on the safety device.204 Second, beyond safety concerns, the consumer's
decision to buy a safety device is also affected by marketing and government
safety regulations. 20 Third, since consumers view spending on safety devices as
a way to reduce risk, the decision to purchase an airbag or a smoke detector is
just as much a measure of whether or not a person is cautious as it is a value of
life. 206 Finally, given the considerable evidence to the contrary, willingness-topay studies focused on consumer decisions make a considerable error in
20
assuming that consumers accurately perceive risk.207 Without a true appreciation
of risk, it is erroneous to argue that a consumer is making a statement about the
value of life when spending money on safety devices.208
Therefore, given the considerable discrepancy of the estimates of human life
and the questionable assumptions made to reach them, a South Carolina court
would likely find that willingness-to-pay models do not meet the threshold of
quality control to be considered reliable evidence inder SCRE 702.
d. Consistency with Recognized Scientific Laws and Procedures
Since adopting the reliability standards under SCRE 702 in State v.
Council,209 South Carolina courts have offered only a limited interpretation of
the final factor for reliability.210 In State v. Jones, the State attempted to use
"barefoot sole impression" evidence to link a defendant with a bloodstained
footprint left in the home of a murder victim.
The court held that the evidence
was inadmissible in part because the evidence was not "consistent with
recognized scientific laws and proceedings." " The court emphasized that the
evidence failed with respect to this requirement because the scientific

202. See id.
203. See Mercado, 974 F.2d at 871.
204. See Scharrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.. 949 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo. App. 1997).
205. See lercado. 974 F.2d at 871.
206. See id.
207. See Anderson v. Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Neb. 1995).
208. See lercado. 974 F.2d at 871.
209. See 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517 (1999) (citing State v. Ford, 301 S.C. 485. 48889, 392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1990)).
210. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 541 S.E.2d 813, 818-19 (2001) (citing Council,
335 S.C. at 20. 515 S.E.2d at 518; State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723. 730-31. 249 S.E.2d 120. 124
(1979)) (providing a brief explanation as to whether the evidence was consistent with recognized
scientific laws).
211. 343 S.C. 562, 541 S.E.2d 813.
212. See id. at 571-72, 541 S.E.2d at 818.
213. See id. at 573. 541 S.E.2d at 819.
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community substantially discredited the barefoot sole impression evidence.
On retrial in State v. Jones,2 the court again held that the barefoot sole
impression evidence was inconsistent with recognized scientific laws and
proceedings because the evidence was not applicable to the general
population. 216 Whether the test is the level of "recognition" by the scientific
community or the general applicability to the population, expert testimony
valuing a plaintiff s hedonic damages using the willingness-to-pay method is not
"consistent with recognized scientific laws and proceedings."
First, just as the science underlying barefoot sole impressions was
discredited in the scientific community, willingness-to-pay studies have faced
considerable criticism from economists and courts alike, making the study far
from a "recognized" science.'
Second, although the willingness-to-pay method
is theoretically applicable to everyone, the method is not generally applicable
because it makes no adjustments for the particularized circumstances that make
an individual plaintiffs life enjoyable. 8 A consistent measure is not
necessarily generally applicable. After all, courts could place a consistent value
on all injured plaintiffs' lost income, but no one would argue that such
consistency is a reliable way to measure lost wages. Therefore, an examination
of the willingness-to-pay method for consistency with recognized scientific laws
and procedures weighs against admitting expert testimony valuing hedonic
damages.
B.

4dmissibility Under South Carolina Rule ofEvidence 403

Assuming that a court admits expert testimony tinder SCRE 702, the court
may still exclude the evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."219 If the trial judge finds that the probative value of the
evidence outweighs any prejudice, the jury may then afford the expert testimony
the weight it deems appropriate.220 Even assuming that a South Carolina court
found expert economic testimony valuing hedonic damages admissible tinder
SCRE 702, the court would not be able to determine whether the evidence's
minimal probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

214. See id.
215. 383 S.C. 535, 681 S.E.2d 580 (2009).
216. See id. at 557, 681 S.E.2d at 591-92.
217. See supra Part IV.A.3.a.
218. See, e.g., Wilt v. Buracker. 443 S.E.2d 196, 204-05 (W. Va. 1993) (explaining the
method using 10,000 generic window washers).
219. S.C. R. EVID. 403.
220. See State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20-21, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999) (citing S.C. R. EVID.
403).
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Those advocating for the use of expert testimony to value hedonic damages
highlight that the probative value of the testimony is the guidance it provides to
make jury verdicts more consistent and fair to inj ured plaintiffs.221 While some
consistency to the valuation of intangible losses may be desirable, the very
suggestion that there is a way to measure the lost enjoyment of life is
-- 222
prejudicial.
As one court noted, even if the party opposing testimony can effectively call
into question the expert's valuation and the trial judge makes clear that the jury
can afford the expert's testimony as little weight as it deems appropriate, there
remains a concern that j urors will be misled and will "latch onto the first expert
figure lobbed their way."2n While courts might not find the jury's reliance on a
figure provided by an expert prejudicial in all circumstances, the valuation of
hedonic damages is likely to cause substantial prejtidice in some cases.
First, an expert placing a definitive value on the enjoyment of life would
prejudice the jury because courts rely on the expertise of the jury to value
i 24
225
intangible losses.
In Boan v. Blackvell2 the court stated that hedonic
damages "are not readily reducible to specific amounts" and left it to the jury to
place a value on the lost enjoyment of life.226 Furthermore, aside from hedonic
damages, courts have concluded that similar intangible losses are not capable of
any precise valuation and must be determined by the jury.227
Second, the method for valuing intangible losses likely prejudices the jury
because South Carolina does not allow courts to reduce intangible damages to
present value.228 As explained previously, the final step of valuing hedonic
damages requires the economist to discount the plaintiff s early lost enjoyment
of life to present value.
In Rhodan v. United States, the court refused to
reduce a jury award for pain and suffering by discounting the award to present
value.
The district court emphasized that "[lt]here are numerous South
Carolina cases which espouse the theory that damages for pain and suffering
have no market price and cannot be determined with exactitude."232 Thus, courts

221. See Taylor, supra note 66, at 1521-22.
222. See Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1964) (quoting Harper
v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 547-48, 124 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1962)).
223. See Kurncz v. Honda N. Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386, 390 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
224. See Harper,239 S.C. at 547-48. 124 S.E.2d at 57 (citing Wright v. Gilbert, 227 S.C. 334,
338, 88 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1955)).
225. 343 S.C. 498, 541 S.E.2d 242 (2001).
226. Id. at 502. 541 S.E.2d at 245.
227. See Hatper, 239 S.C. at 547-48, 124 S.E.2d at 57 (citing T4uight, 227 S.C. at 338, 88
S.E.2d at 75).
228. See Rhodan v. United States, 754 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (D.S.C. 1991) (citing Phillips v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-15 (D.S.C. 1983)).
229. See Berla et al., supra note 61, at 5.
230. 754 F. Supp. 76.
231. See id. at 78-79 (citing Phillips, 575 F. Supp. at 1314-15).
232. Id. at 77-78.
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would not likely find that the limited probative value of expert testimony on
hedonic damages outweighs the considerable risk of prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION

South Carolina recognizes hedonic damages to compensate an injured victim
for the intangible enjoyment of life that she can no longer experience as a result
of some wrongful act by a defendant.233 It is impossible to imagine a scenario
where an individual consciously considers the question "how much would I have
to give you to take away your ability to enjoy your favorite hobby?" It is even
more far-fetched to assume that the individual would then give an honest answer.
Assuming that one could answer the question, there may be no amount of money
that one would accept to have the fun stripped from her life. Given the inexact
nature of these losses, there is a reasonable desire to introduce some form of
consistency to the valuation of hedonic loss.234 The willingness-to-pay method
is a valiant attempt at valuing the intangible; however, it falls too short of certain
to make its way in front of a jury.23
If the courts of South Carolina face the issue, they, too, will likely find that
expert testimony on hedonic losses using the willingness-to-pay method is
inadmissible under SCRE 702 and 403. South Carolina courts have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of leaving intangible losses to the jury.236
Furthermore, the willingness-to-pay method falls short of reliable in numerous
ways.
First, the method provides only the hedonic value of the life of a
statistically average person, effectively failing to assist the jury in determining
how much to value the individual plaintiffs lost enjoyment of life.238 Second,
willingness-to-pay studies that value the entirety of life arguably offer little help
to assist in determining the value of the enjoyment of life.
Third, the inclusion
of certain factors such as consumer spending and labor markets do not directly
capture the value an individual places on enjoying her life.240
Finally,
discounting intangible losses to present value, as required by the willingness-to-

233. See Boan v. Blackwell. 343 S.C. 498, 502, 541 S.E.2d 242, 245 (2001).
234. See, e.g., Berla et al., supra note 61, at I (aiming to develop a system to aid in "the
greater predictability of fair jury awards").
235. See, e.g., Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 870-71 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing howy it
falls short).
236. See, e.g., Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 547-48, 124 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1962) (citing
Wright v. Gilbert, 227 S.C. 334, 338. 88 S.E.2d 72. 75) (stressing the importance).
237. See supra Part IV.A.3.
238. See, e.g., Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1052-53 (N.D. 111.1995) (basing
calculations on a "statistically average person").
239. See Wilt v. Buracker. 443 S.E.2d 196, 205 (W. Va. 1993).
240. See, e.g., Mercado, 974 F.2d at 871.
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pay method, stands in direct contradiction to a decision by a federal district court
in South Carolina.241
The shortcomings are too numerous for an expert to represent to a jury a
specific value of human life. Until the development of a more reliable method,
courts will have to leave valuation of the bits of life with no objective
measurement to the j ury. guided by their own experience and expertise. Whether
this results in overcompensation or undercompensation is impossible to know,
but for now, courts are decidedly in favor of leaving the hedonic value of life to
the jury as the true expert "enjoyers" of life. South Carolina courts should
follow suit.
Tesley B. Lambert

241. See Rhodan v. United States 754 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (D.S.C. 1991) (citing Phillips v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-15 (D.S.C. 1983)).
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